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Over the last 40 years, the legal merits and parameters of 
“affirmative action” policies have been challenged exhaustively from 
state to federal courtrooms. In the most recent landmark case, Fisher 
v. University of Texas,3 the U.S. Supreme Court declined to make a 
decision, instead it continued to allow universities to consider race as 
a factor in admissions to achieve diversity. However, the court also 
opined that universities must prove that “available, workable race-
neutral alternatives do not suffice” before considering race.4 In 
addition, the court ruled – by a 7-1 margin – to send the case back to 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for further review to 
determine if the school passed the test of “strict scrutiny,” the highest 
level of judicial review.5 The ruling advances the trend towards 
continued legal contestation of affirmative action policies – with The 
New York Times characterizing the ruling as “simultaneously modest 
and significant” and “likely to give rise to a wave of challenges to 
admissions programs at colleges and universities nationwide.”6 
Moreover, the ruling further symbolized the hastening away from 
explicit race-based policies and towards more class-based redress, a 
policy prescription gaining more steam amongst the left and right 
alike. 
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3 ,133 S.Ct. 2411(2013) 
4 Id. at 2421. 
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(Jun. 24, 2013) http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/25/us/affirmative-action-
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Contrary to popular belief, affirmative action does not refer 
to a specific law or policy, nor is it designed to redress past 
discrimination.7 Conceptually, affirmative action refers to a set of 
positive anti-discrimination policies, stemming largely from a series 
of Executive Orders, intended to include stigmatized groups in 
preferred positions of society, with aims to promote institutional 
desegregation.8 Empirical evidence consistently shows stigmatized 
groups- in particular blacks, Latinos and women-face daily obstacles 
in hiring, promotion, renting or buying, gaining access to education 
and everyday economic activities.9 Although some social 
desegregation has been achieved in government employment and 
higher education as a result of affirmative action initiatives,10 legal 
decisions concerning how affirmative action should be defined and 
carried out, or implemented, has directly hindered its efficiency in 
creating more equitable outcomes for currently stigmatized groups. 
This article is organized in two interconnected segments. 
First the historical trajectory of affirmative action policies is 
documented, presenting a general chronological discussion of key 
landmark legal decisions from local to national levels. The second 
part of this article draws from empirical evidence to discuss the 
implications of these decisions on unprivileged groups, paying 
particular attention to African Americans and Latinos. In essence, we 
demonstrate that in the absence of race or group-based affirmative 
action policies, without measures of compliance and enforcement, 
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U.S. institutions are increasingly homogenous and segregated. We 
conclude that while race-based criteria are the most effective criteria 
to remedy present-day violations of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 
(non-discrimination clause), if class is to supersede race in the 
popular discourse and eventual policy implementation, “wealth” is a 
far superior proxy for class over “income.” 
 
II. 1960s: The Foundations for Affirmative Action Policies 
 
During the heat of the civil rights movement, important legal 
steps were taken to implement anti-discrimination measures in U.S. 
society. In 1961, President Kennedy signed Executive Order 10925, 
directing federal contractors to take “affirmative action to ensure that 
applicants are treated equally without regard to race, color, religion, 
sex or national origin.”11 While the order was deemed a step forward 
by civil rights activists in eliminating employment discrimination, its 
narrow focus on federal contracting dealt with only one of many 
institutional spheres where racial discrimination was omnipresent. 
Moreover, critics of the move viewed it simply as an extension of 
previous ineffective presidential orders involving federal contracting 
with little legal basis for enforcement12 given that it created the 
Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity (CEEO), which only 
maintained advisory power. 
When the landmark 1964 Civil Rights Act13 was signed, it 
created the legal cornerstone for the eventual “results-based” 
framework affirmative action would eventually employ. In this 
historic act, racial discrimination in public places and institutions was 
declared illegal, enforcement authorizations to desegregate public 
schools were incepted, some standards for voting rights were 
established, but more related to “affirmative action,” federal funds 
could be withheld from federal contractors if there was evidence of 
discrimination on the basis of color, race or national origin. As a 
                                                 
11 Exec. Order No. 10,925 of 1961, 26 FR 1977 (1961). 
12 Bernard Anderson, The Ebb and Flow of Enforcing Executive Order 11246, 86 
AM. ECON. REV. 298, 298-301 (1996). 
13 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. 
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result, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was 
born. The EEOC, though incepted as a federal agency to create and 
ensure a diverse workforce, in reality had a relatively small amount 
of power to actually litigate. 
In 1965, prominent members and sectors of the business 
community began to vocally oppose attempts to fast-track 
“affirmative action” like policies in U.S. law and policy. In this same 
year, after a monumental speech at Howard University when 
President Johnson made his now famous words calling for “equality 
not just as a right but as a result,” he signed Executive Order 1124614, 
requiring all firms with $50,000 or more in federal contracts, or with 
50 or more employees, to take affirmative steps to increase minority 
representation in the labor force. Moreover, this act was different 
from previous orders and pieces of legislation because it introduced 
enforcement procedures and allocated funds to the Department of 
Labor to oversee its follow-through. In this order, Johnson also called 
for a “good faith effort” by contractors to hire underrepresented 
groups, requiring them to conduct self-audits and to create an 
effective affirmative action plan. Two years later, Executive Order 
1137515 was signed as an amendment to the previous order, changing 
the word “creed” to “religion” and making sex discrimination illegal, 
expanding rights and protections for women in facets of the growing 
service sector and ensuring their inclusion in affirmative action 
policies. 
In the late 1960s affirmative action became more of a potent 
anti-discrimination tool as several federal bodies were given 
responsibility for the implementation and governance of anti-
discrimination measures. In 1968, the Housing and Urban 
Development Act of 1968 (Fair Housing Act)16 was signed, 
prohibiting discrimination in housing operated or funded by the 
federal government. The act gave powers to the Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) agency and the Office of Fair Housing and 
Equal Opportunity to oversee and litigate cases of discrimination in 
                                                 
14 Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed Reg. 12,319, 12,935 (1965). 
15 Exec. Order No. 11,375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14,303 (1967). 
16 The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 - 3619. 
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housing sales or rent, and mortgage lending. A year later, under 
pressure from civil rights groups, President Nixon signed Executive 
Order 1147817 further strengthening previous measures ensuring 
equal opportunity for employment in the public sector, but also called 
for affirmative steps in the advancement, training, and treatment of 
“minority” civilian employees. The order also deemed the Civilian 
Service Commission, the agency responsible for federal personnel 
management, responsible for equal opportunity and affirmative 
action in government employment. 
Until the Department of Labor’s Philadelphia Plan, 
affirmative action only extended itself to institutions that received 
public funds. Expanding on previous key Executive Orders (11246, 
11375), the Philadelphia Plan introduced “goals and timetables” for 
the employment of minorities in federal construction projects, and 
required local contractors, unions, and other organizations to sign 
equal opportunity contracts involving both public and privately 
funded construction.18 Not only was the introduction of affirmative 
action to the private sector met with resistance (Congress nearly 
considered banning it), but the Department of Labor also declared 
that the plan would be implemented in other cities unless their 
governing bodies came up with affirmative action plans of their own. 
By the early 1970’s, the potency of affirmative action as an 
anti-discrimination tool was cemented. Through a series of 
presidential orders and laws, not only was the public and private 
sector responsible for hiring and promoting historically and presently 
stigmatized groups, but governmental bodies were also acquiring the 
necessary power to ensure its implementation. It was this power, 
along with the designation of specific underrepresented “groups” to 
merit affirmative action’s benefits, which prompted legal challenges 
toward the conceptual and practical implementation of affirmative 
action initiatives. The next section highlights key court cases that 
illuminate the legal beginnings of public discourse and debate over 
the merits of affirmative action policies. 
                                                 
17 Exec. Order No. 11,478, 34 Fed. Reg. 12985(1969). 
18 TERRY H. ANDERSEN, THE PURSUIT OF FAIRNESS: A HISTORY OF AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION (2004). 
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III. Challenging Affirmative Action, 1970s 
 
In the early 1970s, affirmative action policies were briefly 
strengthened through key orders and legislation. By the time Revised 
Order No. 4 (1972),19 which extended previous executive orders to 
non-construction federal contractors was signed, President Nixon 
had already implemented Executive Order 11625 (1971)20 directing 
federal agencies to develop plans and goals for a national Minority 
Business Enterprise (MBE) contracting program. Moreover, the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 197221 was passed, an 
amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964,22 which gave the EEOC 
full force of statutory law to enforce equal opportunity and 
affirmative action in governmental hiring. It is important to note here 
that this piece of legislation is deemed responsible for increasing the 
number of African Americans and women employed by the public 
sector.23 
By now, the implementation of affirmative action in 
government contracts and employment was being met with more 
avid public resistance. Meanwhile, challenges seeking institutional 
desegregation began to proliferate on judicial dockets. For example, 
in Griggs v. Duke Power, (1971),24 the Supreme Court agreed that 
aptitude tests and diploma requirements in hiring by Duke Power 
repeated past discrimination practices against minorities, violating 
civil rights legislation. As a result, the term “set-asides” using racial 
preferences came to fruition, and more companies began to 
implement race-conscious plans. 
                                                 
19 Revised Order No. 4, 41 C.F.R. part 60-2 (1972). 
20 Exec. Order No. 11,625, 36 Fed. Reg. 19,967(1971). 
21 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub.L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 
(1972). 
22 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. 
23 Winfield H. Rose & Ping Ting Chia, The Impact of the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act of 1972 on Black Employment in the Federal Service: A 
Preliminary Analysis, 83 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 245, 245-251 (1978). 
24 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
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The Griggs v. Duke Power, (1971)25 case presented the 
important link between employment and education. Despite civil 
rights legislation introduced in previous decades, schools and 
universities remained highly segregated. Latinos and Asians were 
legally barred from attending some public schools in many states, 
and women were systematically excluded from both public and 
private universities and professional schools. Some of these realities 
were challenged in San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez, 26 and Adams v. Richardson, .27 In the former, a state court 
found educational financing favored more affluent peoples and 
discriminated against neighborhoods with low property value. The 
Supreme Court accepted the case and disagreed, suggesting that the 
state’s school financing system did not violate the Constitution, and 
remanded back to the state of Texas for resolution. In the latter case, 
a Federal Appeals Court approved a district order calling for federal 
education officials to enforce Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. The 
court discovered that President Nixon’s Health, Education and Civil 
Rights offices were allowing states to practice racial discrimination. 
The decision also identified school districts that were once 
desegregated by law but were still “racially distinguishable.” As a 
result, cities like Baltimore were required to implement plans for 
desegregation or risk a loss of federal funding.28 In 1974, Congress 
passed the Equal Educational Opportunities Act (1974),29 prohibiting 
states from denying educational opportunities on the basis of their 
race, color, national origin or sex. However, the power to use race-
based integration policies such as busing were limited as they were 
met with resistance, and instead policies such as magnet schools, 
transfer programs, and neutrally drawn school zones were introduced 
as alternatives. 
                                                 
25 Id. 
26 411 U.S. 1 (1971). 
27 351 F.Supp. 636 (1973). 
28 Research Frontiers at the University of Maryland, Division of Research, March 
1, 2004, Vol. 3, No. 6. 
29 Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, 20 USC §§1701-1758 (1974). 
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The aforementioned decisions epitomized one of the many 
phases of affirmative action policy conceptualization and 
implementation. In particular, these decisions were emblematic of a 
move towards the questioning of group or race-based policies as a 
means of providing equal opportunity, battling discrimination and 
ensuring integration in public education. The controversy was 
evident through the landmark legal cases, DeFunis v. Odegaard and 
the University of Washington,),30 and Regents of University of 
California v. Bakke,31 the latter having a more profound impact on 
education policy and affirmative action. 
In Defunis, a white pre-law student argued that the Equal 
Protection Clause called for the elimination of racial barriers, 
suggesting racial categories should not be created to demonstrate 
how society is organized. The case was the first to introduce the term 
“reverse discrimination” and to question race as a factor for 
professional schools. The latter case, Bakke,32 legitimized the use of 
race for university admissions when all other credentials are equal, 
but disallowed the use of “set-asides” for minority applicants in their 
admission policies. While recognizing the need to use race-based 
policies to achieve “diversity” in a student body, it called for 
educational institutions to distinguish between goals and quotas, 
finding the latter unconstitutional.33 
While the Supreme Court had redefined the rule of 
affirmative action in higher education, it nearly contradicted itself in 
the employment arena. In United Steelworkers v. Weber, the Court 
upheld a Title VII challenge to affirmative action policies which 
reserved half (50%) of job openings and training programs for 
minorities as long as the plan did not adversely impact whites nor 
prevent them from advancement. Because the plan was seen as a 
temporary, or what the court called a “remedial rationale” designed 
                                                 
30 , 416 U.S. 312 (1974). 
31 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
32 Regents, 438 U.S. 265. 
33 Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative 
Action Debate. 99 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1327-1346 (1986). 
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to eliminate racial and gender imbalances of the past, it was decided 
to be legally permissible.34 
 
IV. The Hostile 1980s – Affirmative Action in Decline 
 
In the 1980s, key legal decisions involving affirmative action 
in employment, education, and housing further changed the design 
and implementation of affirmative action policy. When Ronald 
Reagan was elected President, one of his first initiatives was an 
update to Executive Order 1124635, a decree instituted by President 
Carter consolidating the governance structure of affirmative action. 
Under Carter’s order, the Department of Labor was responsible for 
the enforcement of affirmative action, dealing mostly with 
compliance reviews and regulatory policies. However, Reagan 
quickly dismantled the previous administration’s process, 
introducing new sets of regulations. For example, the previous 
threshold of enforcing affirmative action to government contractors 
with $50,000 or more in contracts was increased to $250,000 or 
more. In addition, goals and timetables were labeled more as 
“guidelines,” the need to comply was withdrawn and contractors 
were given more time to report hiring progress of stigmatized groups. 
Anderson36 argues effectively that the Reagan regime was the 
most visibly hostile toward affirmative action, but the judicial system 
was no different throughout the 1980s. In the arena of employment, 
key decisions reversed past rights guaranteed under the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, and allowed affirmative action policies for temporary 
purposes only. For instance, in Firefighter’s Local Union No. 1784 
v. Stotts,37 the Supreme Court’s decision delimited the power of 
federal trial judges to prevent layoffs of minorities in order to 
maintain their representation in an organization. In addition, it was 
ruled Title VII could only provide relief to those who were actual 
                                                 
34 Rethinking Weber: The Business Response to Affirmative Action, 102 HARV. L. 
REV. 658, 658-671 (1989). 
35 Exec. Order No. 12,086, 43 Fed. Reg. 46,501 (1978). 
36 ANDERSON, supra note 16. 
37 , 467 U.S. 561 (1984). 
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victims of illegal discrimination, inciting a debate brought up in 
Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,38 over whether Title VII 
allows any type of class-based, race-conscious belief to operate as 
designed to remedy historical discrimination or prevent it from 
occurring in the future.39 The outcome of Wards Cove v. Antonio40 
temporarily squashed the debate, when the Supreme Court held 5-4 
that statistical evidence of racial or gender inequalities in workforce 
was not sufficient alone to prove discrimination, removing the 
burden of proof of discriminatory impact away from the employer 
and onto the victim of discrimination (plaintiff). 
On the upside, in Johnson v. Transportation Agency,41 the 
Supreme Court upheld a plan that authorized the consideration of 
gender in promotion decisions, but once again allowed affirmative 
action based on a “remedial-rationale” of the policy. However, in 
City of Richmond v. J.A. Crosson Construction Company, 42 deemed 
one of the most significant civil rights cases of the 1980s, the city of 
Richmond’s (Virginia) affirmative action plan of setting-aside 30% 
of contracts for minority contractors was struck down because it was 
not “narrowly-tailored” to accomplish a remedial purpose. The 
Supreme Court ruled that there must be “compelling interest” such 
as to remedy past discrimination, and that the city must use “strict 
scrutiny” when implementing affirmative action policies.43 
Explained differently, the Supreme Court ruled that state and local 
level affirmative action programs allowing claims of past 
discrimination do not justify “set-aside” programs, which Justice 
O’Connor argued were rigid versions of quotas. 
 
V. The 1990s: Defending Affirmative Action 
 
                                                 
38 476 US 267 (1986). 
39 Robert N. Roberts, The Public Law Litigation Model and Memphis vs. Stotts, 
45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 4, 527-532 (1985). 
40 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
41 480 U.S. 616 (1987). 
42 , 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
43 George R. La Noue, The Impact of Croson on Equal Protection Law and Policy. 
61 ALBANY L. REV. 1, (1997). 
36 JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW & POLICY Vol. 36.1 
In the early 1990’s, Congress responded to some of the 
previous decade’s hostile court decisions on civil rights. In the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991,44 which amended the 1964 landmark law, 
Congress overruled the Supreme Court decisions (primarily Wards 
Cove v. Atonio,)45 by re-placing the burden on employers to ensure 
and prove that they were not practicing discrimination against 
stigmatized groups. It also re-allowed women and under-represented 
groups to call for damages in cases of intentional discrimination in 
the workplace, strengthening their civil rights protections. 
A year later, the need for affirmative action in housing was 
reaffirmed in NAACP Boston Chapter v. Kemp..46 In that district 
case, all Boston-area HUD affirmative fair housing marketing plans 
were ruled to have failed in their “statutory mandate” to represent the 
racial composition of the city as a whole. As a result, the consent 
decree triggered affirmative action goals in similar urban contexts, 
requiring cooperation for dispersal of assisted housing in 137 cities 
and towns nation-wide. 
In 1993, one of President Clinton’s first decisions upon his 
election was an update to Executive Order 11246,47 signing the 
toughest affirmative action decree known to date. The Order focused 
on the worst offenders of minority hiring and procurement, primarily 
the construction trades, and called for more aggressive actions 
including “debarment” of contracting licenses for contractors acting 
in non-compliance. Two years later, opponents of affirmative action 
went on the offensive, and federal hiring programs were once again 
debated in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Frederico Pena.48 In this 
case, the Supreme Court made a nearly identical ruling as in 
Crosson,49 but this time restricted the use of affirmative action 
policies in federal highway construction contracts. According to the 
Court’s majority, race-based preferential government policies, 
                                                 
44 Civil Rights Act 1991, H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 1st session (1991). 
45 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
46 721 F. Supp. 361 (1989). 
47 Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed.Reg. 12,319, 12,935(1965). 
48 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
49 City of Richmond v. J.A. Crosson Constr. Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
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specifically those targeting disadvantaged groups, must receive the 
highest level of scrutiny. Moreover, the government would have to 
tailor preferential policies toward past discrimination, but not 
everyday grievances. 
The Adarand50 decision represented a major setback for 
affirmative action, and both President Clinton and Congress followed 
with subsequent decisions responding to pressure for reform. In July 
of 1995, while defending the need for affirmative action as a means 
toward alleviating institutional desegregation, President Clinton 
signed a memorandum calling for the elimination of any program that 
involved quotas, preferences for unqualified individuals, that 
“reverse discriminates” or continues as policy after equal 
opportunity has been achieved. Affirmative action was still alive, but 
in a limited form. The memorandum was followed by the approval 
of the Equal Opportunity Act (1995),51 not just prohibiting 
discrimination in federal employment hiring on the basis of an 
individual’s race, sex, national origin or color, but also prohibiting 
any form of preferential treatment in hiring practices. 
Amidst the controversies of affirmative action policies in the 
federal employment arena, race-based policies in higher education 
were also legally challenged. In 1995, the Board of Regents of the 
University of California voted to remove race/ethnicity, religion, 
color, or national origin as a consideration in admissions, contracting 
or hiring in the state higher education system. A year later in 
Hopwood v. University of Texas Law School, ,52 a federal court ruled 
that admissions procedures illegally discriminated against white 
applicants, banning separate admissions and financial aid based on a 
person’s race or ethnicity. This decision challenged the historic 
Bakke53 decision, which rejected quotas but argued race could be 
used as a factor for university admissions. Moreover, in Hopwood 54 
                                                 
50 Adarand, 515 U.S. 200. 
51 Equal Opportunity Act of 1995, S.1085, 104th Cong (1995). 
52 78 F.3d 932, 948 (1996). 
53 Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
54 Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 948. 
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“diversity” as a goal in intellectual institutions was not of 
“compelling interest” to the state. 
As the new millennium approached, affirmative action, as a 
general set of institutional desegregation policies, was clearly in 
decline. After Proposition 209,55 a law banning all forms of 
affirmative action in public employment, public education or public 
contracting, was passed in California in 1997, subsequent states 
followed with laws mirroring the decision. Washington State enacted 
Initiative 200 and Florida banned race as a factor in college 
admissions in 2000. Taken together, this represented a movement 
away from an explicit acknowledgement that racism and 
discrimination persist towards an internalization of the “post-racial,” 
the unwarranted belief that America has largely transcended its racial 
divide. 
 
VI. Revitalization or Last Breath? The New Millennium 
 
In 2000 a federal judge ruled that the use of race as a factor 
for admissions at the University of Michigan was constitutional.56 
The university argued, and the judge agreed, that if legacies, athletes 
and other groups deemed beneficial to the university were given 
preferential treatment, so too could “minority” (read: blacks, 
Latinos) groups be seen as contributing to a diverse intellectual 
student body. In a separate challenge to the university’s law school 
admissions criteria, a judge saw no relationship between racial 
diversity and intellectual diversity. The case was reversed on appeal 
a year later, re-igniting nearly 30 years of judicial contradictions and 
interpretations surrounding affirmative action’s legal validity.57 
After the Board of Regents of the University of California 
took back some of their 1997 decisions in 2001, reinstating some 
affirmative action policies in the university system hiring and 
admissions policies, the Supreme Court also partially revived and 
redefined the policy. Agreeing to hear the aforementioned University 
                                                 
55 California Civil Rights Initiative, Prop. 209 (1996). 
56 Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (2001). 
57 Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (2002). 
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of Michigan cases in 2003, the Supreme Court ruled that there is a 
“compelling interest” to acquire education and training in a diverse 
student body. While disallowing a system used by the undergraduate 
institution that gave additional points for admission based on an 
individual’s racial identification, it did allow race to be used 
alongside other criteria as long as there was no strong emphasis on 
it. Moreover, the law school was allowed to admit a “critical mass” 
of minority students in order to ensure a heterogeneous student body, 
declaring the value of diversity in public institutions. 
In 2007, divisions within the U.S. Supreme Court continued 
to manifest themselves in contradictory opinions, with the cases of 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District 
No. 1 and Meredith v. Jefferson County, as the battlegrounds58.  In 
these cases the courts ruled that public school systems could not seek 
to achieve or maintain integration through measures that take explicit 
account of a student’s race. 59. These rulings invalidated programs in 
Seattle, WA and metropolitan Louisville, KY that sought to maintain 
school-by-school diversity by limiting transfers on the basis of race 
or using race as a “tiebreaker” for admission to particular schools.60 
Importantly, both programs had been upheld by lower federal courts 
and were similar to plans in place in hundreds of school districts 
around the country. However, in a separate opinion on Parents 
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle, Justice Anthony Kennedy 
wrote that achieving racial diversity, “avoiding racial isolation,” and 
addressing “the problem of de facto resegregation in schooling” were 
“compelling interests” that a school district could constitutionally 
pursue as long as it did so through programs that were sufficiently 
“narrowly tailored.”61 The opinion produced by Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle case contained the infamous and 
simplistic statement by Chief Justice John Roberts that, “the way to 
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stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on 
the basis of race.”62 
Most recently, in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, the 
Supreme Court – by a 7-1 margin – ruled that the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit misinterpreted precedent and should re-
evaluate the case of plaintiff Abigail Fisher, who claimed that the 
university unconstitutionally discriminated against her.63 While not 
outlawing affirmative action programs, the Court continued to 
reinforce the notion that such programs must meet a test known as 
“strict scrutiny.” The opinion provided by Justice Kennedy indicates 
that a university’s use of affirmative action will be constitutional only 
if it is “narrowly tailored”and an indispensable component of 
achieving diversity.64 Accordingly, the practical implications of this 
decision indicate that courts will need to ascertain and determine that 
the use of race as a component of admission decisions is indeed 
“necessary.”65 
Despite the unpredictability of how states will interpret the 
Fisher ruling, at present, the future of race-based affirmative action 
remains uncertain. Thus, how far, or to what extent, can affirmative 
action go to achieve goals of equal opportunity, integration and 
diversity in employment, education, housing and all aspects of public 
life given the constant legal redefinition of its parameters? An 
examination of the empirical evidence from various spheres in which 
affirmative action has been employed as an anti-discrimination tool 
and a look at the prevailing sentiments impacting opinions pertaining 
to affirmative action policies are starting points in addressing this 
question. 
 
VII. Post-Racialism and the Conundrum of Persistent 
Disparities 
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In an era that renders positive anti-discrimination measures 
as unnecessary, a position undoubtedly contradictory considering the 
aforementioned (and discussed below) empirical evidence that yields 
otherwise, this section addresses the propagation that the Civil Rights 
movement was successful and that we’ve entered an era of race-
neutrality or “color-blindness,” where race is viewed as a thing of the 
past. We begin, for example, with a July 2013 Gallup poll that 
indicated two-thirds of Americans were found to believe that college 
applicants should be admitted solely based on merit, with only 28% 
believing an applicant’s racial and ethnic background should be 
taken into account to promote diversity on college campuses. 
According to the poll a full three-quarters of white Americans believe 
that college admissions should be solely based on merit. Conversely, 
the very same poll finds that a majority of Americans – 58%—still 
support affirmative action programs more generally.66 
The meritocratic underpinnings and color-blind centrality of 
the above poll are key in understanding how the perception of “post-
racialism” is hostile to structures, policies and alternative narratives 
which attempt to bring to light and ameliorate persistent racial 
disparities. To explain, we turn to economists Darrick Hamilton and 
William Darity, Jr. (2010),67 who describe the propagation of post-
racialism as a shift from an acknowledgement of some form of 
societal social responsibility for the condition of black America to a 
more overt position and ethic of individual personal responsibility. 
This rhetoric posits that discrimination and other social barriers are 
largely of a by-gone era, and that blacks must cease playing the 
‘victim role’.”68 The authors note that the post-racial narrative often 
acknowledges the existence of racial discrimination; however, it 
conversely makes the process of redress for specific oppressed 
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groups more difficult due to a “rising tide lifts all boats” mentality.69 
In addition, what seems to be missing from the post-racial narrative 
is an explicit acknowledgement of the overwhelming preponderance 
of empirical evidence that indicates the measure of inequality. 
In a recent reflection of the present state of race relations in 
the United States, long-time race and inequality scholar Lawrence 
Bobo provides three potential definitions of post-racialism, which he 
refers to as laissez-faire racism.70 According to the author, in the 
post-racial era, a new pattern of attitudes and beliefs have emerged, 
leading to a more covert, sophisticated, culture-centered, and subtle 
racist ideology, qualitatively less extreme and more socially 
permeable than Jim Crow racism.71  Bobo frames the perniciousness 
of the narrative by asking, “In an era of widespread talk of having 
achieved the post-racial society, do we have real evidence that 
attention to and meaning of basic race categories are fundamentally 
breaking down?”72 
Turning to an examination of the empirical evidence on the 
veracity of having achieved a post-racial society, we can answer that 
it is in short supply. As an example, while the face of poverty remains 
societally stigmatized as a person of color, the evidence shows this 
stigmatization to be false. According to recent (2013) figures 
calculated by the Census Bureau, two-thirds of those below the 
poverty line identify as white.73 Moreover, while proportionally 
poverty rates for blacks and Latinos are nearly three times higher than 
that of whites, the overwhelmingly predominant face of the poor is 
white. More than 19 million whites fall below the poverty line for a 
family of four, a figure nearly double the number of poor blacks..74 
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In the realm of employment, the latest figures provided by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics note that the overall black unemployment 
rate was estimated at 12.9% and at 9% for Latinos, compared to 6.3% 
for whites and an overall national rate of 7.2%.75 The figures from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics for 2012—broken down by 
educational attainment—present a starker underscoring of the 
reality.76 For instance, in 2012 the unemployment rate for whites with 
less than a high school diploma was 11.4%, but for black Americans 
with less than a high school diploma the rate was estimated at 20.4%. 
The unemployment rate in 2012 for whites with a bachelor’s degree 
or higher was 3.7%, but for black Americans it stood at 6.3%.77 These 
trends are well rooted in a historical context as the overall 
unemployment rate for black Americans has always been roughly 
double that of whites and for Latinos roughly one and a half times 
that of whites.78 Research has also demonstrated that even after 
taking educational attainment into account, black men are 
overrepresented or “crowded into” low-wage jobs and 
underrepresented or “crowded out” of high-wage jobs, determining 
that the most likely explanation is labor market discrimination. 
Large racial disparities in income and wealth also persist. In 
1940, when the U.S. decennial census began collecting wage and 
earnings data by race, the typical black male earned less than 45 
percent of what the typical white male earned, and by 1980 the 
earnings gap fell to a little over 70 percent where it has more or less 
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remained.79 At the household level, median adjusted household 
income for blacks is now 59.2% that of whites, up slightly from 
55.3% in 1967.80 Moreover, white families possess substantially 
more wealth than black and Latino families.81 Prior to the 2007 Great 
Recession, data from the 2005 Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP) revealed a white household median net worth of 
approximately $135,000 and a black household median net worth of 
a little over $12,000.82 Thus, the typical black family had less than 9 
cents for every dollar in wealth of the typical white family. After the 
Great Recession, this gap nearly doubled with the typical black and 
Latino family having about a nickel for every dollar in wealth held 
by the typical white family, with the typical black household having 
$5,677 in net worth and the typical Latino household $6,325.83 A 
more recent report from the Institute on Assets and Social Policy at 
Brandeis University84 indicates that the wealth gap almost tripled 
from 1984 to 2009, increasing from $85,000 to $236,500 with the 
median net worth of white households in the study growing to 
$265,000 over the 25-year period compared with just $28,500 for 
black households.85 Data from the Survey of Consumer Finances has 
also been used to demonstrate that in 2010, whites on average had 
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six times the wealth of blacks and Latinos.86 In fact, after adjusting 
for inflation, the median net worth for black households in 2011 
($6,446) was lower than it was in 1984 ($7,150), while white 
households’ net worth was almost 11% higher.87Taking all of the 
aforementioned into account, what is absolutely clear from the 
empirical evidence is that the racial wealth gap exceeds $100,000 and 
is expanding. 
With the aforementioned socioeconomic racial disparities as 
sober frames, the question then becomes what has been the effect of 
attempts to address these persistent disparities through affirmative 
action measures? This section addresses the practical implications of 
affirmative action policies, drawing from scholarly studies that 
measure progress of institutional desegregation. Problems with this 
type of analysis are two-fold; First, because affirmative action is not 
one coherent policy, but rather redefined over the last 50 years 
through a series of executive and administrative orders and judicial 
decisions, deciphering any impact depends on what Anderson has 
called the “ebb and flow” surrounding the implementation of the 
policy.88 Second, affirmative action has been carried out in housing, 
employment, higher education and other spheres where the inclusion 
of underrepresented groups is the mission, making for a difficult 
general assessment. However, as this section will underscore, there 
is ample evidence that overall, decisions by state and federal courts 
on affirmative action have almost immediate impacts on the extent 
of desegregating US institutions. Moreover, research shows that in 
the absence of measures of compliance, violations of Title VII 
continue to persist. 
*** 
Researchers first began to assess the impact of affirmative 
action policies in the 1970s. In the early years of affirmative action, 
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it was found that upon initial enforcement, black male employment 
among federal contractors was more abundant in clerical and 
operative occupations, but less so in management jobs.89 Rose and 
Chia 90 drew similar conclusions, questioning the impact of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,91 the law giving statutory 
validity to affirmative action measures in the governmental 
employment arena.92 Using numerical data provided by the Civil 
Service Commission in 1974, initial assessment of minority-hiring 
progress was disappointing. The authors found too few blacks in 
higher-level governmental agency positions and too many in lower-
level positions.93 The reasons, the authors suggest, point to the 
context of the times; affirmative action was still young, and working 
in government was seen as a last resort of unemployment given its 
long-standing history of hostility toward African Americans.94 
A few years later Clynch and Gaudin focused on the 
integration of women in the workforce and drew similar conclusions 
about the public sector, but found some progress in the private 
sphere. Prior to this study, no scholars had made a comparative 
analysis of affirmative action’s implications in both the private and 
public sectors.95 Examining female/male employment patterns in 
private and naval Maritime shipyard jobs (occupations traditionally 
held by men), female employment increased by 4% in private 
shipyards, but only 0.5% in government facilities.96 The authors gave 
a plausible explanation: while increase in female employment was 
not dramatic in either setting, the slight progress in the private sector 
                                                 
89 George Burman, The Economics of Discrimination: The Impact of Public 
Policy (1973) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,on file with the University of 
Chicago Library). 
90 Rose, supra note 21. 
91 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub.L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 
(1972). 
92 Exec. Order No. 11,478, 34 Fed. Reg. 12,985, 3 C.F.R. 803 (1969). 
93 Rose, supra note 21. 
94 Id. 
95 Edward J. Clynch & Carol A. Gaudin, Sex in the Shipyards: An Assessment of 
Affirmative Action Policy, 1 FEM. STUD. 1, 75-103 (1972). 
96 Id. 
36.1 JUDICIAL HISTORIES AND RACIAL DISPARITIES 47 
may have been due to the governance structure of affirmative 
action.97 Private companies, looking to acquire contracts from the 
government, needed to abide by affirmative action requirements or 
risk losing them.98 Monitoring government agencies, on the other 
hand, required more time and resources due to their bureaucratic 
components. 99 
The aforementioned study, along with the work of Goldstein 
and Smith100 and Heckman and Wolpin,101 make general assessments 
about the impact of affirmative action on employment in its early 
stages: the representation of women and African Americans in 
employment sectors was beginning to increase, but they were over-
represented in lower-level occupations. Leonard challenged these 
assessments and painted a contradictory picture for the late 1970s.102 
The author agreed that the presence of blacks and women had indeed 
grown among federal and non-federal contractors, but also found an 
increase in demand for stigmatized groups in higher-skilled jobs.103 
The author points to the vigorous enforcement of affirmative action 
during this time period, suggesting progress had come when 
government intervention was stronger.104 
While affirmative action matured as a policy in the late 
1970s, with positive consequences for women, Latinos, African 
Americans, Asians and other stigmatized groups, the hostility toward 
affirmative action during the Reagan regime marked significant 
declines for above groups in both public and private employment. 
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Carlson’s robust intra-occupational review of U.S. Census data 
makes this clear, illustrating that race/sex occupational inequality 
declined significantly from the 1960s to 1970s, but from 1980 to 
1989 increased dramatically.105 Leonard also makes similar 
observations, pointing to a lack of enforcement by government 
agencies under the Reagan years as important factor in institutional 
desegregation.106 
By the early 1990s, Reagan’s attempt to weaken and 
dismantle affirmative action extended into Bush Sr.’s tenure, with 
evidential effects on stigmatized groups during these years. For 
example, studies by the GAO 107 and the Fair Employment Council 
of Washington (1993)108 found significant discrimination against 
designated minority groups in the employment sector, primarily 
African Americans and Latinos. The former study found that Latinos 
were offered 25% fewer job interviews than whites, and received 
34% fewer jobs than whites.109 The latter report, consisting of a series 
of tests undertaken over two years, found that blacks (24%) and 
Latinos (22%) were treated significantly worse than whites while 
searching for employment (despite equal qualifications).110 An 
Urban Institute111 report made similar findings in the housing arena, 
with both equally qualified Black and Hispanic testers experiencing 
discrimination 50% of the time in their negotiations with real estate 
agencies, compared to 20% for whites. 
Upon incremental rejuvenation of affirmative action during 
the early 1990s and into the Clinton era, a White House Staff Report 
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to the President112 hailed the necessity of affirmative action policies, 
illustrating the positive impact of anti-discrimination legislation in 
improving minority representation in education along with federal 
and private employment and earnings.113 The report cited that not 
only did the quantity and quality of education for black workers 
improve their earnings by 20% (overall) since the 1960s, the growth 
of women in professional schools also coincided with increased anti-
discrimination measures.114 
While the White House staff did question why earnings gaps 
still existed between blacks and whites and males and females, and 
also admitted that progress had been stifled during the 1980s, the 
authors vehemently defended the need for affirmative action.115 
However, by the late 1990s, attacks on affirmative action began to 
resurface in U.S. courtrooms. The decision to disallow race as a 
factor in admissions in Hopwood v. University of Texas Law 
School116 not only adversely affected minority enrollment in the state 
of Texas, but also impacted other states in the Fifth Circuit where the 
ruling was made. 
In a study by the Civil Rights Project at Harvard 
University,117 the dismantling of affirmative action in higher 
education was found to have almost immediate effects. Upon 
approval of Proposition 209118 in California, the landmark act 
prohibiting the use of race, ethnicity, sex or national origin in public 
education (including employment and contracting), the authors found 
evidence of an overall decline in minority enrollment in state 
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universities in a short amount of time.119 For example at UC-
Berkeley and UCLA respectively, Latino enrollment dropped from 
14.5% to 7% and 15.8% to 11% in one academic year (1997-
1998).120 In academic hiring, the number of women faculty fell 22 
percent throughout the state.121 
Finally, in examining the overall state of the evidence 
pertaining to affirmative action, Holzer and Neumark122 determined 
that affirmative action had a significant redistribution effect coupled 
with relatively small economic efficiency consequences, which 
indicates low levels of “waste” or deviation from an optimal 
allocation of resources.123 In addition, Holzer and Neumark124 also 
determined that affirmative action improved opportunities and 
outcomes for its beneficiaries, while also generating positive external 
benefits to others.125 Crucially, they also determined that the costs 
borne by whites, in terms of lost jobs or lost positions at elite colleges 
and universities, and the costs borne by employers had been limited. 
 
VIII. Moving Forward  - Defending and Expanding 
Affirmative Action 
 
Despite evidence of both continued inequities based on race 
and the effectiveness of affirmative action as an anti-discrimination 
policy and means of institutional desegregation, the societal assault 
on affirmative action as a policy remedy continues. Citizens of all 
stripes, including post-racial liberals, have engaged in the dichotomy 
of passive and active formation of a coalition designed to deconstruct 
a policy that is deemed threatening to the dominant power structure. 
This threat is contained in its very existence, which forces the society 
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adopting it to acknowledge the reality and persistence of systemic 
racism and not simply as some abstract historical notion, an 
admission which may be the biggest source of “grumbling” against 
affirmative action.126 From a political perspective, Democrats and 
Republicans have implemented a tacit agreement not to speak about 
race. When was the last time affqirmative action was mentioned by 
either party? As illustrated above, there is ample empirical evidence 
to indicate that affirmative action works and therein, shall we say, 
lies the rub. 
The central question surrounding race-based affirmative 
action continues to be ignored on a persistent basis: Has structural 
racism/inequality diminished to such an extent that policy 
prescriptions such as race or group-based affirmative action are no 
longer needed? There are reasons (wealth gaps, employment gaps, 
persistent mass incarceration and on and on) to conclude that the 
answer is a resounding no.127 Unfortunately, privileged power 
structures in American society are unwilling to engage in the process 
of overcoming the mental mythology of a zero sum game, where 
affirmative action policies are viewed as insidious plots designed to 
tear down all the good work done by privileged folks over the years. 
With this in mind, we borrow from john a. powell128 who 
provides a useful frame in turning away from the effects of post-
racialism or what he terms “false universalism” and turning instead 
towards a policy of “targeted universalism.”129 The author asks, 
“How are we to understand racial conditions in society, and what is 
the proper role of public policy and law for addressing or avoiding 
racial questions?” in an attempt to move away from what he sees has 
become an overly individualistic approach to race, racism and 
racialization.130 Addressing the issue of post-racialism, he further 
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states that, “[t]he post-racialists see the civil rights activists and the 
explicit racists as locked in a struggle that has already been won”131 
A consequence of this turn towards post-racialism and race-
blindness or neutrality in the design of policy and programs, powell 
effectively argues, is that this false universalism will not serve to 
address the needs of marginalized groups but instead will most likely 
exacerbate existing inequalities.132 Accordingly, false universalism 
fails to address the situational differences of varied groups of people 
in relation to institutional and policy dynamics.133  As an alternative, 
powell calls for engaging in the work to ensure that our institutions 
do the work we want them to do by adopting strategies that are both 
targeted and universal.134 A targeted universal strategy is one that 
while inclusive of the needs of both the dominant and the marginal 
groups, pays particular attention to that of the marginal group.135 
Whether categorized as six affirmative action grumbles136 or 
nine nifty arguments against affirmative action,137 attempts at 
nullifying affirmative action policies have continued unabated. For 
example, it is increasingly argued that if affirmative action is to 
survive in higher education, a preferred form is to substitute family 
income for race as a fairer criterion for selective college 
admissions.138 Undoubtedly, class and race-based affirmative action 
policies are not mutually exclusive and both could contribute to the 
effective desegregation of universities, but race-based affirmative 
action is specifically designed to combat persistent racial 
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discrimination while class-based policies are not.139 Ideally, the two 
approaches should serve as complementary, non-mutually exclusive, 
desegregation and anti-discriminatory tools.140 Solely class-based 
affirmative action will not be effective in reaching sites of 
discrimination, if discrimination occurs on the basis of race, and it 
cannot replicate that which can be accomplished by race-based 
affirmative action141. 
Despite the relatively mixed signals provided by the U.S. 
Supreme Court during the past decade, to ensure that preferred 
positions of society include presently stigmatized groups is becoming 
increasingly difficult. Despite the compelling empirical evidence that 
demonstrate that in the absence of strict group or race-based 
affirmative action policies, institutions are more socially segregated 
and increasingly racially and ethnically homogenous, we are instead 
moving toward systematically violating both the spirit and practical 
implementation of the monumental Civil Rights Act of 1964. As 
Justice Sotomayor stated in response to the prevailing view of the 
court in the Fisher case, “the way to stop the discrimination on the 
basis of race is to speak openly and candidly on the subject of race, 
and to apply the Constitution with eyes open to the unfortunate 
effects of centuries of racial discrimination.” Given those 
“unfortunate effects,” we conclude that when government 
intervention is stronger, and measures of compliance and 
enforcement are set in place, affirmative action policies can be 
effective tools toward desegregating relatively elite positions of 
society and deterring marketplace discrimination. 
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